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The dynamics of inequality in a newly settled, pre-industrial society: 
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One  reason  for  the  relatively  poor  development  performance  of  many  countries  around  the 
world today may be the high levels of inequality during and after colonisation. Evidence from 
colonies in  the  Americas  suggests that  skewed  initial  factor  endowments could  create  small 
elites that owned a disproportionate share of wealth, human capital and political power. The 
Cape  Colony,  founded  in  1652  at  the  southern  tip  of  Africa,  presents  a  case  where  a 
mercantilist company (the Dutch East India Company) settles the land and establishes a unique 
set of institutions within which inequality and development evolve. This paper provides a long-
run  quantitative  analysis  of  trends  in  asset-based  inequality  (using  Principle  Components' 
Analysis on tax inventories) during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, allowing, for the 
first time, a dynamic rather than static analysis of inequality trends in a newly settled and pre-
industrial society over  this period. While theory testing in other societies has been  severely 
limited  because  of  a  scarcity  of  quantitative  evidence,  this  study  presents  a  history  with 
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The dynamics of inequality in a newly settled, pre-industrial society: 




Inequality is a major concern in many of the world‟s developing regions. South Africa is no exception, as 
the voluminous literature on the subject attests to (see Bhorat and Kanbur 2006, for example). Indeed, 
modern  South  Africa  is  one  of  the  most  unequal  societies  in  the  world,  primarily  as  a  result  of 
institutionalised inequality under colonial segregation and Apartheid, but potentially also stemming from 
the set of institutions created much earlier under Dutch and British colonial rule (Terreblanche 2002). 
This paper will investigate inequality in the early colonial period. It is apparent in the literature that 
inequality is severely persistent; countries that exhibit high inequality from early stages of development 
generally continue to do so later on, while few policy prescriptions are successful in reversing the trend, 
even in times of high and sustained economic growth.  
 
These observations have resulted in an emergent literature that uncovers the roots of inequality during a 
country‟s  early  stages  of  development,  and  explains  the  influence  of  these  initial  conditions  on  the 
subsequent distribution of wealth (Engerman and Sokoloff 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001; 
Frankema 2009). Some dominant insights have emerged from these investigations. One strand of the 
literature focuses on newly settled societies. In particular, the initial factor endowments of good climate 
and  a  large  native  population  seem  to  create  institutions  that  promulgate  persistent  inequality.  This 
phenomenon relates particularly to the set of institutions that are enabled by these factors and allows the 
initially well-positioned in society to attempt to continually secure the balance of economic and political 
power. The second strand of this literature focuses on the dynamics of inequality in societies that have 
undergone some development, but have not yet entered a phase of industrialisation. Pre-industrial growth 
may increase inequality during the early phases of development, in contrast to dominant theories that 
suggest that this only commences at the onset of industrialisation (Van Zanden, 1995).  
 
The Cape Colony, founded in 1652 at the southern tip of Africa by the Dutch East India Company 
(Verenigde Oostindische Companje, or VOC), presents a case study of a society that is established by a 
coloniser with a new set of institutions that were unrelated to the status quo. This newly imposed setting 
potentially had a large impact on the inequality and development trajectories of the territory. This marked 
change in institutions (particularly within the context of the pre-industrial era) provides a context to 
illuminate the previous literature on the roots of inequality. The availability of tax inventory records from 
almost  the  beginning  of  the  settlement  period,  allows  the  analysis  of  the  dynamics  of  the  wealth 
distribution of a society that is firstly on a path of initial flux and subsequent stabilisation during its 
pioneering  phases.  Secondly,  the  extensive  sample  uncovers  how  this  unique  set  of  newly  created 
institutions bears out not only on starting levels of inequality, but also once this framework stabilises and 
the economy matures. These particular aspects present a somewhat different set of circumstances to those 
found in the early years of colonisation in the Americas (the dominant focus of the literature). This allows 
a partial validation of past observations that also correlate with these territories, but furthermore colours 
in aspects that were not visible in the institutional contexts of other newly settled societies. In particular, 
the role of immigration and the mercantilist approach of the VOC come to the fore. The latter is an 
important institutional feature of the Cape Colony, particularly because it was established by a private 
company, and not by a national crown. 
 
This paper creates a set of asset indices with principle components‟ analysis, using data recorded for VOC 
taxation purposes (the opgaafrollen). These constructs are used to estimate measures of asset inequality 
for  the  period  1663  to  1757,  roughly  the  first  century  of  Dutch  settlement.  This  is  the  first  formal 
quantitative analysis of inequality trends for the Cape Colony during the initial period of settlement. It  
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supplements the qualitative literature (based on archival historical evidence) that emphasises the role of 
an emerging gentry in the distribution of wealth (Guelke and Shell 1983). In a comparative context, the 
study uses micro-level data to provide long-run quantitative inequality measures for a seventeenth and 
eighteenth century colony, allowing, for the first time, a dynamic rather than static analysis of inequality 
trends in a newly settled and pre-industrial society in this period. While theory testing in other societies 
has been severely limited because of a scarcity of quantitative evidence (Williamson 2009), this study 
presents a history with evidence, enabling an evaluation of the Engerman-Sokoloff and other hypotheses. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the theories on the roots of inequality 
and the impact this has on subsequent economic development. Section 3 sketches the context of the early 
Cape Colony settlement and its institutions, while Section 4 explores the existing historical evidence 
(primarily archival and anecdotal) relating to inequality within that context. Section 5 briefly exposes the 
usefulness and limitations of the opgaafrollen data in the analysis of inequality. Section 6 outlines the 
methodology used to construct the asset indices. Section 7 presents the results and an extensive set of 
robustness checks, while section 8 offers interpretations of the findings within a comparative context. 
Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. INEQUALITY IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL, NEWLY SETTLED SOCIETIES 
 
The question as to why some European colonies developed into prosperous societies (such as North 
America, Australia and New Zealand) while others remained relatively underdeveloped (the Caribbean, 
South America, Africa) is prominent in the recent economic history literature (Acemoglu and Robinson 
2000; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001; Engerman and Sokoloff 2000; 2002). 
 
One explanation posits that high rates of inequality in colonial societies may have been influenced by 
initial institutions in these newly settled societies, and in turn high inequality significantly influenced the 
perpetuation of these institutions. The framework which emerged had a bearing on the way in which these 
societies  were  able  to  develop  (Engerman  and  Sokoloff  2000;  2002;  2003;  2005).  The  roots  of  the 
inequality lay, according to Engerman and Sokoloff (2002: 35), not in differences in national heritage or 
religion, but in the “initial factor endowments (broadly conceived) of the respective colonies”. Two initial 
factors are postulated to have been especially important in generating high inequality: a suitable climate 
and  soil  for  the  cultivation  of  sugar  and  other  highly  valued  commodities  (where  slave  labour,  in 
particular, was productively employable), and large concentrations of native people. These two conditions 
encouraged the formation of a small, elite immigrant society which maintained a disproportionate share of 
wealth, human capital and political power. This linkage will be discussed below.   
 
Having attained this power, the elite was “able and inclined” to persist with the status quo, even at the 
cost of general welfare, by establishing a basic legal framework that protected their share of wealth and 
power (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002: 17). Thus, the institutions that evolved in these regions tended to 
contribute to the persistence of inequality, thereby restricting access to economic opportunities for the 
broader population and in turn limiting growth (Engerman and Sokoloff 2000: 223). 
 
Two  policies  provide  evidence  of  these  institutional  arrangements:  land  allocation  and  immigration 
policies. While land was offered relatively freely and in small units in the United States and Canada, land 
ownership remained highly concentrated in the rest of the Americas (especially Spanish America), with 
the result that fewer individuals held larger portions of land and great inequality ensued (Engerman and 
Sokoloff  2000:  224).  The  establishment  of  typically  smaller  farms  in  the  United  States  and  Canada 
favoured grain farming, in contrast to the economies of scale enjoyed by sugar plantations and other 
valued commodities in the Caribbean and elsewhere. Furthermore, in contrast to the open immigration 
policies promulgated in North America, immigration in Spanish America was tightly controlled. Because 
land in these colonies was initially granted in large blocs to the early wave of settlers, they looked to the  
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Spanish Crown to protect their privileged positions. Engerman and Sokoloff (2002: 18) note that these 
immigration policies could not have been maintained had a “substantial supply of Indians to work the 
land and otherwise service the assets owned by the elites and the Spanish Crown” not been available. The 
size of the native population was therefore a key determinant in the type of immigration policies that 
followed, and consequently had a bearing on inequality. It is evident that an interaction between initial 
production factors determines inequality. The first scenario is one with a small potential native workforce 
in the colony, so that farmers had to work the land themselves, and farms could only remain small as a 
result. This  prevented the  emergence  of  any  elitism  and  subsequent  inequality.  The  second  scenario 
consists of a large native workforce (or of imported slave labour), which allowed farmers to work larger 
portions of land. This lead to the higher concentration of capital, which in turn allowed an elite to be 
established and subsequently the incentives arose to form institutions that maintained this status quo. As a 
result, inequality was high and persistent in the second scenario.
2 
 
A further explanation for rising inequality was proposed some years ago by Simon Kuznets. Kuznets 
famously argued that income inequality follows an “inverted-U” curve as a country moves from a low to 
a high level of development. His conjecture was that inequality would tend to increase during the early 
phase of capitalist development and only equalise after a sustained period of economic growth when the 
economy has matured (Kuznets 1955).
3 Yet, Kuznets (and those that  extended his work, most notably 
Lindert and Williamson) applied the theory to industrialising societies only. 
 
In 1995 Jan-Luiten van Zanden found proof that Europe ascended a “super-Kuznets curve even before 
industrialisation  (sometime  during  the  sixteenth,  seventeenth  or  eighteenth  centuries)”  (Van  Zanden 
1995). Whereas Kuznets had intended his theory to apply to industrial economic growth, Van Zanden‟s 
hypothesis  claimed  that  Europe  already  experienced  an  increase  in  economic  activity  prior  to  the 
Industrial Revolution, and that this pre-industrial growth had already resulted in an increase in inequality. 
 
Why is this so? A number of explanations have been posited for the existence of a Kuznets, or super-
Kuznets, curve. Firstly, Kuznets himself argued that modern economic growth caused a shift in labour 
from low productivity sectors – agriculture – to high productivity sectors – industry and services (Kuznets 
1955). Initially, nearly all the labour force is employed in agriculture. As agricultural workers move from 
agriculture to industry, inequality increases. This occurs up to a certain point, when half the population 
has moved between the sectors. Thereafter, as more agricultural workers move into industry, inequality 
begins to decline. A parallel argument can be made with the rural and urban population substituting 
agriculture and industry. Kuznets has, however, emphasised that a specific set of conditions or institutions 
                                                 
2 Williamson (2009) argues that inequality was much lower in Latin America during the early phases of European 
settlement. In fact, he finds little evidence that suggests inequality was persistent over centuries, as argued by 
Engerman and Sokoloff, and concludes that the persistence of inequality in Latin America “is a myth”. While his 
results shed some doubt on the severe levels of inequality proposed by earlier research, the transmission mechanism 
of relatively high initial inequality to institutions that perpetuate inequality is not invalidated (see Frankema (2009) 
for an exposition of Latin American land inequality). In fact, inequality measures at the Cape are comparatively 
similar to the results for Spanish America reported in Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson (2008).  
3 Although Kuznets was himself not convinced of the empirical evidence for his hypothesis, a noteworthy group of 
scholars agree that the Kuznets curve holds for the early industrialized countries, notabl y Britain and the United 
States. Williamson, although not the first to do so, proclaims in his book „Did British Capitalism Breed Inequality‟ 
that the “facts support Simon Kuznets‟ (1955) conjecture that income inequality is likely to show an early rise and 
later decline as economic development proceeds” (Williamson 1985: 200). Relying on a range of data sources, he 
concludes that the rise in inequality began in 1760. Although interrupted by the French Wars, inequality increased 
rapidly after Waterloo. “British inequality seems to have reached a peak somewhere around the 1860s or shortly 
thereafter. While not spectacular, the egalitarian levelling up to World War I was universal” (Williamson 1985: 
200). The evidence for the United States is as compelling (Williamson and Lindert 1980).  
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have to exist for these changes to occur – and he was sceptical of the generalisation of his theory across 
time and territory (Kuznets 1971).   
 
More recently, another explanation has been put forward. This sees differential wage payments as an 
important contributing factor to an initial rise in inequality. Early economic growth would tend to increase 
the wages of skilled workers at a higher rate than unskilled workers, resulting in growing inequality 
(Williamson 1982). Van Zanden finds this consistent with the period of pre-industrial growth and credits 
the rise in inequality of pre-industrial Holland to this explanation (Van Zanden 1995). 
 
3. THE CAPE COLONY 
 
The first Europeans to permanently settle in the Cape Colony arrived in 1652 with the aim of building a 
small refreshment station to replenish resources for passing ships of the Dutch East India Company 
(VOC) en route along the trading route to the East Indies. The history and institutions of this colony are 
therefore distinctly related to that of a private company, and not of a national state.  
 
Cape Town was the hub of economic activity in the Cape Colony.
 Economic and social life in Cape Town 
revolved around the goods and services required by the passing ships; the town was known as the “tavern 
of the seas” with nearly every house providing some form of public entertainment or lodging (Schutte 
1980). Passing ships provided a large demand for Cape goods and stimulated production in other regions 
of the Colony (Boshoff and Fourie 2008a; 2008b). 
 
The first commander of the refreshment station at Cape Town, Jan van Riebeeck, soon reported back to 
the Lords XVII (the directors of the VOC) that the Cape required a free farmer population to ensure the 
sufficient production of food. This consisted primarily of fresh produce and staples. Consequently, in 
1657 nine company officials were deployed as vrije burghers (free citizens) on small plots close to the 
fort in Cape Town. Jan van Riebeeck had envisaged a tight-knit community of farmers pursuing intensive 
agriculture, while at the same time protecting the borders of the settlement from aggressive intents of the 
native population. Soon Van Riebeeck realised that such a strategy would not work: the farmers had few 
labourers available and even less capital; the availability of free land encouraged extensive, pastoral 
farming (Guelke 1980: 47). Livestock, either purchased from the VOC, or bartered with or stolen from 
the  native  Khoikhoi,  provided  farmers  with  a  means  of  living  that  dispensed  with  labour-intensive 
practices and would later provide a means of long-distance transportation over the rough terrain of the 
interior. By 1663, the area Van Riebeeck had hoped would accommodate thousands of farmers had been 
divided into 15 large farms with a male population of only 16 settlers (Giliomee 2003: 2&9).  
 
Most years were marked by harvest failures and a shortage of food in the Colony. Support from the 
Netherlands was often required. Extensive farming forced the VOC to adopt a policy of expansion; Simon 
van  der  Stel,  who  arrived  in  1679  as  governor,  immediately  promulgated  new  areas  for  settlement: 
Stellenbosch (1678) and Drakenstein (1688). The number of farmers, receiving relatively large plots of 
land, grew gradually as the borders of the Colony expanded to the north and the east. By 1687, the free 
citizen headcount was 700, of which 200 were adult males (De Kock 1924: 27). 151 French Huguenots 
arrived at the shores of the Cape in 1688. These settlers, with some experience of farming, but little 
capital, immediately took up viticulture (already started by Van Riebeeck in 1655) in the Drakenstein 
area.  The  French  population  quickly  assimilated  into  the  Dutch  society,  with  the  French  language 
vanishing within two generations (Botha 1939: 40-49). 
 
The initial allocation of larger plots assisted settlers to establish fairly viable farming operations given the 
lack of other physical and human capital (stock farming was less labour-intensive). When the Huguenots 
took up viticulture in the more fertile areas, labour became an important factor of production. While land 
substituted  for  capital  requirements  to  some  extent,  labour  was  supplied  by  the  Khoikhoi  and  more  
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importantly through the importation of slaves (already from 1658, but especially after the expansion of 
the  Colony).
4  The  latter  arrangement  therefore  compensated  for  the  “large  native  population”  that 
Engerman and Sokoloff proposed as a precursor to high and persistent inequality. 
 
By 1700, the fertile area west of the first mountain ranges (stretching from modern-day Somerset West to 
Tulbagh) had been populated by European farmers. Production, for the first time, reached a surplus. This 
area  was  the  main  supplier  of  wheat  and  wine  to  the  city  and  passing  ships.  Because  of  property 
ownership in this region, these farmers could accumulate capital to increase future production. Historians 
agree that while some farmers‟ production remained just above subsistence levels, others attained great 
wealth, as illustrated by the beautiful Cape Dutch mansions still to be found on many of these wine farms 
(Giliomee 2003: 31). The emergence of this gentry played a decisive role in explaining inequality in the 
territory, particularly when contrasted with the poverty of the nomadic frontier farmers. 
 
In 1708, the Company requested that immigration to the Colony be discouraged as the objectives of the 
Company, to supply produce for passing ships, had been met as a result of the extension of the frontier. 
This  echoes  what  happened  in  South  America,  though  here  it  is  not  apparent  that  this  limit  on 
immigration was lobbied for by an emerging elite. Despite this apparent prosperity that came to the fore, 
the farmers were unhappy with the economic restrictions at the Cape. The VOC pursued a mercantilist 
policy; most goods could only be sold directly to the Company, prices were fixed and monopoly contracts 
for nearly every type of produce  were sold to the wealthiest farmers. Farmers were prohibited from 
selling their produce directly to the ships within the first three days of arrival, even if these ships were not 
of Dutch origin. No opportunity for export was allowed, as products would compete with VOC exports. 
Wheat, wine and brandy, in low volumes and mostly of an inferior quality, were the major exports to the 
East Indies (with some exported to Europe). Severe restrictions were placed on manufacturing and all 
imports were heavily taxed by the Company.
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The natural increase in the population necessitated the expansion of the Cape territory beyond the first 
mountain ranges. The Company had already allowed grazing outside the Colony‟s borders, with farmers‟ 
sons or trusted servants herding and hunting during the winter months in the interior. In 1713 a new loan-
system was introduced beyond the existing borders, whereby farmers were granted large farms on loan for 
five years. A fee of 24 rix-dollars (one rix-dollar equalled 2.4 guilders) gave holders exclusive control of 
a minimum of 2420 hectares (6000 acres) of land (Giliomee 2003: 30). While farms could not formally be 
sold (only the buildings were allowed to be sold), loan licenses were rarely revoked (except in cases 
where the annual fee was not paid). The opening of the new frontier resulted in a gradual exodus of 
settlers from the original Cape frontier to the interior. While stock farming in the interior made up one-
tenth of all agricultural producers in the Cape by 1716, by 1770 stock farmers formed two-thirds of all 
farmers in the Colony (Giliomee 2003: 31). The stock farmers of the interior, mostly living a nomadic life 
on the frontier, had little incentive to settle for long periods of time. Given the absence of property rights 
in this region and the fact that land was available relatively freely, farmers decided to move on as soon as 
pasture became depleted. In this way, farmers were limited in the accumulation of capital to only those 
goods that could be transported by ox back or wagon. It is evident from this historical evidence that 
interregional inequality would have been a dominant feature of the economy by 1770. This inequality is, 
however, not measured in this study, as the sample period ends in 1757, by which time the records from 





                                                 
4 Slaves came mostly from Madagascar, Indonesia (Java), India, Angola and Mozambique. 
5 See Ross (1982) for an exposition of the Cape economy institutions.  
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4. INEQUALITY IN THE CAPE COLONY 
 
The set of arrangements outlined above all have an impact on the distribution of wealth in the Colony. 
The  section  that  follows  explores  the  circumstantial  evidence  to  synthesise  the  historians‟  view  of 
inequality during this period. 
 
The first farmers in the Cape Colony were all Company servants released by the Commander of the Cape 
station.
6 These settlers had few resources at their disposal: first, they had no capital to in vest in the new 
farms. The Company did provide them with some tools and cattle, but all remaining investments had to 
come from the farmers themselves. The settlers also had little knowledge of the climate, soil and 
vegetation, and even less expertise in farm operations and techniques. 
 
The availability of labour was another constraint for the farmers. Farmers had to rely on imported slaves 
and the native Khoikhoi. Because most farmers were former Company servants, many were unskilled and 
inexperienced in hard farm labour. Many resisted work and moved as soon as possible, either to the city 
or back to Europe by hiding on boats (Van der Merwe 1938: 50). While the local Khoikhoi did have 
entrenched knowledge of the local climate and geography (which made them v aluable farmhands), they 
could not be enslaved and could easily move away if life on the farm became too demanding. 
 
The living conditions of these early farmers were poor. Coetzee  (1942: 41) notes that the church often 
collected money to give to needy far mers whose “naked kids were sleeping in the hay with horses and 
cattle”. Due to the tough terrain, capital and labour scarcity and low prices for agricultural products 
offered by the Company, many farmers remained subsistence farmers, producing only a small surplus in 
order to purchase necessities from the market. 
 
Yet, historians note that not all farmers remained poor. Giliomee calculates that the gentry, measured as 
those  who  owned  more  than  sixteen  slaves,  totalled  seven  per  cent  of  the  rural  population  in  1731 
(Giliomee 2003: 30). Wealth among the rural Cape farmers increased greatly throughout the early part of 
the eighteenth century (Guelke and Shell 1983; Terreblanche 2002: 156). In 1755, the Governor and his 
council issued a plakkaat (ordinance, known as the sumptuary law) with the view to “limiting the number 
of horses, carriages, jewels, slaves, etc., which an individual of this or that rank might possess” (Giliomee 
2003: 30). Although similar ordinances had been issued earlier, the High Government in Batavia noted in 
the preamble to the 1755 ordinance that the “splendour and pomp among various Company servants and 
burghers … reached such a peak of scandal” that the issue had to be dealt with more seriously (Ross 
1999: 9). This sumptuary law was concerned with the display which was allowed on the horses, carriages 
and guides, and the number of horses used.  
 
Visitors also noted the expensive taste of some farmers. In 1783 a traveller to the region wrote that on 
several farms he had observed “nothing except signs of affluence and prosperity, to the extent that, in 
addition  to  splendours  and  magnificence  in  clothes  and  carriages,  the  houses  are  filled  with  elegant 
furniture and the tables decked with silverware and served by tidily clothed slaves” (Naudé 1950). De 
Kock (1924: 35) argues that such luxurious habits were, in part, a consequence of the social conditions 
created  by  slavery.  In  the  Engerman  &  Sokoloff  analytical  framework,  one  might  expect  that  these 
conditions would have lead to the attempted maintenance of this balance of power. It is precisely this 
status quo which the sumptuary laws attempted to counter. 
 
Wealth was not universal, not even within the group of Cape rural farmers. Some farmers remained poor, 
supported by the gentry through generous loans. The inheritance rule, which granted half the estate to the 
spouse after the death of the landowner and the other half divided between the sons, created conflict 
                                                 
6 The Commander of the Cape Colony only later received the title of Governor.  
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within families and resulted in many remaining on land that was too small to cultivate viably. Many of the 
younger sons had to move away. 
 
The only land that was available for the resettlement of overcrowded farms was in the interior, where the 
loan system was enforced. Life on the frontier was difficult. Countless travel journals document the abject 
poverty of many frontier families, where many lived in tents and wagons. Woeke, the first colonial 
official of Graaff-Reinet, described his living quarters as “a hut … without door or glass windows, where 
the wind continuously blows dust inside” (Müller 1980: 26). Carl Peter Thunberg, a Swedish botanist in 
the interior during the 1770s, noted the use of tanned animal skins for ropes, bags and blankets, and even 
as clothes for the extremely poor (Thunberg 1795: 52). 
 
While poor, there is ample qualitative evidence of the changing distribution of wealth of the free settler 
population in the Cape Colony during the first century of Dutch rule. The following sections investigate 




The opgaafrollen were recorded for the purposes of tax collection by the VOC. Detailed household level 
inventories and records of agricultural and other business activities were captured during most of the first 
Dutch occupation (1652-1795), and even in the early period of British rule (1795-1803). This information 
was used to establish each household‟s tax burden. The data used in this analysis spans the period from 
1663 to 1757, roughly the first century of VOC settlement.  
 
Many households specialised in subsistence non-market production because of the strongly centralised 
role of the VOC in organising markets and transactions. For this reason, monetary income data (where 
available) is not a good reflection of total well-being. However, the availability of asset indicators in the 
tax records offers more comprehensive measures of household wealth. This section continues to establish 
which indicators can most successfully discriminate between wealthy and poorer households, but also 
considers the limitations of the data. 
 
The opgaafrollen will be used to construct asset indices for households. It should be borne in mind that 
the asset baskets in this data are period-specific and are not comparable to those typically implemented in 
modern studies (see for instance Filmer & Pritchett, 2001). As a consequence, the selection of indicators 
is  framed  within  a  historical  investigation.    The  taxation  procedures  of  the  VOC,  as  well  as  other 
historical evidence, are considered to define what “prosperity” was considered to be in that period.  
 
The available data is silent on the size, type and value of both land and buildings occupied by farmers. 
These elements typically constitute important items in asset indices, and are furthermore important to  
directly establish the validity of the Engermann and Sokoloff assertions regarding the initial distribution 
of capital. The rural Cape farmers received freehold land (“free and full property”) from the Colony, 
although there were some restrictive conditions attached to these agreements (De Kock, 1924: 30). The 
size was determined by what the farmer could cultivate within the first three years of residency (Van der 
Merwe, 1938 :63). The system of freehold farms was used until the end of the seventeenth century, when 
most of the fertile rural Cape area had been occupied. At the start of the eighteenth century, the system of 
loan-farms was introduced, predominantly for pastoral, stock farmers of the interior. The size of these 
farms was determined by walking half-an-hour in each direction. These farmers had to pay rent to the 
Company; from 1714 an annual fee of 12 rix-dollars per farmer was charged, which was increased to 24 
rix-dollars in 1732 (De Kock, 1924: 30). In 1732, the quitrent tenure system was also introduced, where 
small plots of land could be leased for 15 years from the government. This system did not have wide 
appeal. In 1743, loan freehold was introduced where a loan farm could be converted into a loan freehold 
farm on perpetual lease from the Company. However, revenues from loans, quitrents and loan freeholds  
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were sporadic, with large-scale evasion and corruption of officials. Unfortunately, there is no attempt in 
the opgaafrollen to record these important measures, possibly because a flat rate rent applied, regardless 
of size and quality of land. Guelke & Shell (1983) use evidence of aggregate land holdings in their 
overview of early inequality at the Cape. These  macro measures and cannot be consolidated with the 
opgaafrollen, which constitute a micro dataset. Yet, it would seem that the evidence, as reported by these 
authors, support the results found below, suggesting that the value of the land and the returns from the 
land (which are important elements of the asset baskets that the microdata allow us to construct) were 
closely correlated. 
 
The Cape economy was predominantly based on slave labour. One of the remarkable features of the 
European population at the Cape was the widespread slave ownership, especially in Cape Town and on 
wheat and wine farms (Giliomee, 2003: 45; Armstrong & Worden, 1988). While arable farming and slave 
numbers were few during the early years, by the turn of the century there “developed a close correlation 
between the number of adult male slaves owned and the output of arable farms” (Armstrong & Worden, 
1988: 137). This was especially true for the rural Cape district, especially towards the middle of the 
eighteenth  century.  As  Armstrong  and  Worden (1988:  137) note:  “Although  there  were  fluctuations, 
depending on the success of the annual crop as well as the accuracy of census recording, it is apparent that 
farmers producing both wine and grain had the closest correlations, and hence were the most efficient in 
exploiting their slaves largely because they made more intensive use of them throughout the year”. By 
1750, half of European males owned slaves, with 57 per cent of that group owning one to five slaves and 
another 22 per cent six to ten (Giliomee, 2003: 45). Slaves were therefore an important predictor of 
farming success, and as a result contributed positively to asset wealth in this period. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of slave ownership across various years
7. It is evident that in the earlier years, there was a 
high concentration of households with few slaves. This concentration gradually shif ted, as households 
acquired implemented more slaves into the production process. By 1757 it is clear that a number of richer 
farmers had in excess of 40 slaves, corroborating the evidence of an emerging gentry amongst this cohort. 
This picture offers a pre-taste of the evolution of overall asset wealth at the Cape, and suggests that the  
average farmer became substantially wealthier in the first century of settlement.  
 
                                                 
7 The density is plotted on a log scale in order to more clearly illustrate the spread. The distribution of slaves is 
highly skewed to the right and assumes the lognormal form that modern day income distributions do.  
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Agricultural indicators dominate the records. The tithe (10% of gross production accrued to the VOC) 
was imposed on all grains harvested, though not with any consistency. In addition to freehold farmers, 
loan farmers were also expected to comply from 1714 (De Kock, 1924: 81). However, many farmers only 
harvested enough to subsist and were not able to deliver the required portion to the VOC. Furthermore, 
individual farmers were expected to transport their debt to the company stores in Cape Town, which 
meant that the incentives to evade grew considerably. Farmers in the interior, in particular, were less 
inclined to comply with this regulation. As a result, the tithe was later only imposed on grain that was 
transported  into  Cape  Town  for  trading  purposes.  The  implication  is  that  this  data  is  likely  to 
undercapture subsistence activities and that many farmers would not appear in the dataset whatsoever. A 
dual effect is possible: the poorest would have evaded the authorities and not appear in the data (which 
would reduce inequality) and many others would have under-reported their harvests to pay a smaller tithe 
(which would increase inequality). It is not certain to what extent this unstable institutional framework 
has impacted the quality of the data and inequality measures.  
 
The tax records also capture the number of muiden of each seed that was sown. This data is likely to have 
been captured with greater certainty, as it did not represent the unit of taxation.
8 It furthermore resembles 
the concept of an asset more closely, as it represents “stock” that is reinvested into the venture. This is, 
however, only a short-term asset, as will be considered below.  
 
                                                 
8 In isolated cases, however, harvests were reported without any evidence of any seed sown. In this case the seed 




Similarly to grains, wine and brandy was taxed at 3 rix-dollars per leaguer upon entry into Cape Town. 
Again, as was the case with rented land, this was a flat tax, unrelated to the quality or real value of the 
product (De Kock, 1924: 82). As with the tithe, it means that many farmers may not have been captured 
in the data. The number of vines planted may be more reflective of the true wealth of farmers, as this is 
closer  to  the  conventional  understanding  of  a  long-term  asset,  which  yields  returns  over  multiple 
harvesting periods. 
 
In addition to the taxes centrally imposed from Cape Town, local taxes were instituted in the various 
districts.  Poll  taxes  were  collected  from  individuals  in  each  district,  though  the  enforcement  and 
application of the “ability to pay” criterion varied greatly as a result of the discretion left to settler 
councils  (De  Kock,  1924:  84).  Ability  to  pay  in  the  early  years  of  settlement  in  Stellenbosch  and 
Drakenstein was determined by livestock ownership, which was the most obvious indicator of wealth: the 
head tax was absorbed into a proportional tax on the numbers of sheep and cattle that were owned. These 
items are recorded in the dataset (perhaps for the purposes of the local taxes) and therefore serve as 
important long-term indicators of prosperity that are unlikely to vary considerably over the short-run.  
 
In present-day studies of the distribution of wealth, modes of transport contribute importantly to asset 
indices. Vehicle ownership is in itself an indicator of the means of self-sufficiency and a means to access 
the  marketplace.  However,  even  within  this  category,  the  type  and  status  of  vehicles  discriminates 
strongly between different levels of wealth. In pre-industrial societies, horses – and, to some extent, cattle 
in the Cape Colony – played this role. While this possession was a contributor to wealth directly and 
facilitated the production process, only the number of horses, and not particular characteristics of the 
asset, separated the rich from the poor in the data. As mentioned above, limits were eventually placed on 
the possession of horses, as this represented excess in the Colony. 
 
Pig farming was also prevalent in the Cape, though less than 1% of the sample registers positive values on 
this indicator. It is therefore proposed that the number of pigs should not carry great weight in the indices, 
despite high a priori inequality by this measure. 
 
The discussion above focuses largely on agricultural indicators. Should these be the dominant factors 
determining  wealth in  the  Cape  Colony,  they  will paint  a  clear  picture  of  inequality.  However,  this 
information remains silent on the prosperity of any individual that did not invest in any of the assets 
mentioned. Consequently, all merchants, traders, administrators and any other non-agricultural workers  
would have no wealth if gauged by these possessions. Indeed, the records consist of a substantial sample 
size with zeroes for all of horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, vines and grains. Most of these observations were 
recorded within the district of Cape Town, where economic activity was more diversified than only 
agricultural production. One could therefore infer that these individuals constitute a “non-farmer” sub-
population. However, zeroes could also result from the incentive to under-report and evade taxation. The 
inclusion of many zeroes in the analysis could distort inequality measures, with an upward bias caused by 
an  inflated  lower  tail  of  the  asset  distribution.  Zeroes  have  long  carried  important  information  in 
economic theory (as corner solutions in the utility sense) and particularly in the analysis of micro-datasets 
(Fry et al, 2000; Keen, 1986). Excluding these observations could therefore also distort inequality, as it 
ignores the decisions not to participate in this type of economic activity. However, as the information on 
these  particular  non-farmers‟  choices is limited, it  is  not  clear  how  effectively  this problem  may  be 
circumvented. The only assets in the data that are common to both segments of this society are the 
possession of slaves, flintlocks, pistols and swords. While the former are well-documented, the weapon 
grouping  is  sporadically  measured.
9  Consequently, inequality measures are compared for the whole 
                                                 
9 Indeed, many of the asset indices computed below accorded negative weight to these measures. Conventionally 
possession of assets should contribute positively to wealth, unless a stigma is attached to that commodity. For 
instance Moser & Felton (2007) indicate that black and white televisions contribute negatively to wealth indices in  
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sample and also by excluding those identified as non-farmers by the criteria mentioned above. Later 
analysis includes this group and also supplements the data with zeroes on all assets for slaves (for which 




Authors  studying  modern  inequality  have  the  choice  of  using  either  consumption,  income  or  asset 
measures found in household surveys, while the opgaafrollen constrain us to measuring wealth inequality. 
The first approach has been the more conventional,. however, the exploration of asset inequality has also 
featured prominently in the recent literature. Theoretical reasons for this shift include the notion that 
wealth informs decisions to invest in education and other long-term forms of capital: inequalities in initial 
wealth  feed  through  to  inequalities  in  returns  to  these  long-term  investments.  Furthermore,  asset 
possession is less sensitive to temporary economic fluctuations, as opposed to consumption and income 
which may be highly responsive to circumstances relevant to only a particular year. Assets therefore often 
serve as better indicators of potential lifetime well-being. Measurement, however, is also a definitive 
concern in choosing asset over money-metric measures of inequality. Income and consumption data are 
known to be plagued by measurement error as a result of privacy concerns, seasonal fluctuations and 
recall bias. As assets compose fairly stable and visible features of households, they are apparently less 
likely  to  be  incorrectly  measured  (McKenzie,  2005).However,  assets  in  modern  studies  are  usually 
enumerated by carefully designed surveys. Our reliance on pre-industrial tax records (and the incentives 
for evasion surrounding them) may not offer the same hope of eliminating measurement error as modern 
studies claim
10. Nevertheless, the “long-term” aspect of inequality is reinforced by using this unit of 
measurement. Furthermore, the opgaafrollen did not collect the micro-level money-metric data required 
to analyse inequality in this manner, as the values of these commodities were ignored in the taxation 
procedures, as noted above.  
 
This paper uses principle components analysis (PCA) using the assets reported in the VOC tax records to 
create various indices of wealth. The population represented here only includes European settlers and a 
small number of free slaves that were required to pay taxes. The co-existence of parallel societies with 
different modes of economic exchange was not recorded by the VOC (such as the Khoikhoi society), and 
is consequently not analysed. The initial section of this study therefore only considers the status of the 
settlers that were allowed to farm in Cape Town and the hinterland for their own gain. It is likely that 
overall inequality in the Cape Colony was far more pronounced, as a consequence of unrecorded details 
of slaves‟ welfare. To account for this possible feature, further results are introduced, assuming that slaves 
were not only asset possessions of the free settlers, but were themselves assetless individuals. The latter 
assumption means that there is no variation within the slave cohort, as each has been assigned with zero 
wealth; this strategy, however, provides a better depiction of the bottom tail of the distribution than if this 
population were ignored altogether. 
 
Principal components analysis has been widely used to construct asset indices using household survey 
data (Filmer & Pritchett, 2001; McKenzie, 2005). The aim is to reduce the dimensionality of a number of 
variables that capture asset ownership. The eigenvectors of the data‟s covariance or correlation matrix are 
                                                                                                                                                             
recent times, particularly with the inclusion of colour televisions. In this data, it appears that incidence of weapons is 
low in later years. In 1705 no weapons were recorded whatsoever. This year is therefore excluded from the analysis. 
It is not clear whether this is a result of poor recording or whether this is indicative of reality. There is no indication 
in the literature consulted that these items were taxed, and would therefore not be well-captured by officials. 
10 The salient difference is that monetary incomes are poorly measured in modern surveys as they form the unit of 
taxation, while it is assets that may have been poorly measured in Cape Colony records for precisely the same 




computed and each associated eigenvalue represents the proportion of the variance explained by that 
principal component. Consequently, the first principal component (with the largest eigenvalue) is used to 
weight the original variables to create the new index, as it contains the most information on the original 
data.  Usually  researchers  choose  the  correlation  matrix  to  summarise  the  data,  as  this  circumvents 
problems resulting from vastly different units of measurement (such as slave numbers and muids of wheat 
sown in the current context). The use of the correlation matrix is equivalent to standardising all variables 
and  conducting  principal  components  analysis  with  the  resulting  covariance  matrix.  However,  by 
definition the predicted asset index is, as a result, a variable of mean zero and standard deviation equal to 
the  associated  eigenvalue  (McKenzie,  2005).  Consequently,  the  asset  index  contains  many  negative 
values, which does not translate well conceptually into the idea of income and consumption levels. The 
main problem, however, is that standard inequality measures, such as the Gini coefficient, cannot be 
computed  or  interpreted  in  the  regular  fashion.  Adjustments  to  the  conventional  measures  can  be 
calculated to accommodate negative values (Chen et al, 1982). This approach is, however, not common in 
the more recent literature. 
 
The alternative is to use the covariance matrix of the original variables, so that the asset index has a 
minimum value of zero. However, as McKenzie (2005) notes, principal component analysis assigns the 
largest weight to the variable with the most variance. Since variance is unit dependent, the variable with 
the largest absolute values tend to dominate the index, without necessarily indicating real asset value. For 
instance, in the current context, the number of vines accounts for close to all the variation in the asset 
index when the covariance matrix is implemented.  
 
To address both problems simultaneously in this study, variables are scaled by their standard deviations 
(so that the units do not influence which variable carries greatest weight in the index), but the means are 
not subtracted. A covariance principal components analysis is applied to this data, with the result that the 
predicted asset index remains non-negative, while the weights that each variable contributes to the index 
are  identical  to  those  found  with  the  fully  transformed  variable.  This  enables  the  calculation  of 
conventional  inequality  measures  with  ease. This  procedure is equivalent  to  a  PCA  on  a  correlation 
matrix, followed by a shift of predicted indices upwards to enforce a minimum value at zero.  
 
Because  the  series  of  cross-sections  used  spans  nearly  a  century,  it  is  important  to  consider  how 
definitions and composition of “wealth” have changed. For this reason, it may be necessary to construct 
asset indices for each of the cross-sections under consideration. For instance, vine plantations are only 
reported from 1688, 25 years after these records were first collected. While it plays no role for the first 
quarter of the period, the volumes of vines planted increase substantially in subsequent years, because of 
an influx of French settlers and presumably because this activity is considered an important economic 
asset to farmers.  
 
The  construction  of  principle  components  indices  for  each  separate  year,  however,  raises  issues  of 
comparability. McKenzie (2005) and Moser & Felton (2007) recommend establishing weights by pooling 
all  years‟  data,  so  that  components  account  for  both  intertemporal  and  interhousehold  variation. 
Sensitivity testing is conducted by performing all analyses using the separate annual indices and an index 
constructed using pooled data and therefore assigning “aggregate” values to commodities over the entire 
period. 
 
Following the construction asset indices at the household level, they are converted to per capita amounts, 
to  account  for  differences  between  large  and  small  households.  All  inequality  indicators  are  then 
calculated  by  weighting  household  obervations  by  household  size  to  provide  measures  of  individual 




The objective of this study is to identify intertemporal changes in inequality, and not necessarily the level 
therof  in  any  given  period.  To  test  the  robustness  of  these  trends,  two  measures  of  inequality  are 
employed. The most well-known indicator of inequality, the Gini coefficient, is supplemented by an 
analysis  of  the  Theil  coefficient.  The  former  is  sensitive  to  inequality  in  the  middle  ranges  of  the 
distribution, while the second emphasises inequality attributed to a large upper tail (Champernowne, 
1974). As is evident below, much of the inequality is driven by changes driven in the extremes of the 





Several  principal  component  analysis  (PCA)  asset  indices  were  calculated  to  test  the  sensitivity  of 
inequality  measures to  the  inclusion  and  exclusion of  several  possessions. The  characteristics  of the 
different input variables (as well as the historical context, as outlined above) were considered to establish 
credible constructs. Full details of which variables were used to construct the various asset indices are 
outlined in Table 1. 
 
<INSERT Table 2 HERE> 
 
The “Short and long term” index includes the full set of variables available in the dataset. Assets are 
assumed to carry value in the long-run and in the short-run. The “Long Term” index excludes some of the 
more volatile assets, which are susceptible to seasonal fluctuations and do not hold value for a period 
longer than the year of harvest. In particular, the crops that are sown are excluded from the analysis, as 
they resemble temporary inventories that produce a return only once. Vines, however, are included, as 
they are likely to yield returns over multiple seasons. The reporting of weapons is inconsistent over time 
(as mentioned above) and in the latter years of the sample contributes negatively to many of the asset 
indices (particularly those established on an annual basis and towards the end of the sample). For this 
reason, “Core 1” does not take these items into consideration. As the robustness checks below reveal, this 
strategy offers more consistent inequality trends. This leaves us with a core group of variables that appear 
to be consistently indicative of wealth in the Cape Colony. This construct of wealth is also supported by 
the historical evidence presented above, which suggests that slaves were vital elements of the agricultural 
production process (and hence represent high value), and that cattle and sheep ownership were used by 
settler councils to gauge the ability to pay the poll tax.  However, to test the sensitivity of the assumption 
that vines should not be treated similarly to other crops, they are excluded from the “Core 2” index. This 
is also done to account for the fact that the cultivation of vines only started later in the sample. “Core 3”  
purposefully  excludes  pigs,  as  very  few  farmers  kept  these  animals.  Inequality  would  be  inflated 
artificially if it was not the elite that undertook these farming activities, but pig farming represented a 
marginal activity.. Vines are, however, included, to test inequality between affluent wine farmers and the 
rest  of  the  population.  The  two  alternatives  of  the  core  index  are  also  used  to  calculate  inequality 
measures, to see whether these two commodities unnecessarily drive the trends presented below. The 
“Common” index is constructed with assets common to both agricultural and non-farmer households. 
This index includes only slaves and weapons, without any agricultural indicators of wealth, and is used to 
evaluate the impact of excluding non-farmers from the sample, particularly in light of the fact that most of 
the variables at our disposal measure agricultural attributes. 
 
Indices were based on the respective first principal components. Scree plots (not shown) reveal that high 
proportions of the variation in the data were explained by the respective first components
11. Each asset 
                                                 
11  For  the  pooled  sample  a  clear  “kink”  appears  after  the  eigenvalue  of  the  first  component  for  most  PCAs 
conducted. This is not true for the samples that calculated different weights for each year, underlining the rejection 
of using separate weights for the individual years, when it is more difficult to explain the full variation in the data  
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was weighted positively in the indices (except in isolated cases). This indicates that these components are 
reflective of asset ownership. Negative weights were in some cases accorded to weapons, particularly 
when indices for separate years were established. This is indicative of sporadic record keeping, or implied 
inferiority of this asset grouping in later periods. The result is that many households received a negative 
score on these particular asset indices for these years. This leads to non-sensible estimates of the Gini and 
Theil coefficients, the primary measures of inequality adopted here. This phenomenon can be ascribed to 
the changing distribution of these assets over the entire period and the particularly low levels of reporting 
in  the  latter  part  of  the  sample  (see  Table  3).  This  observation  prompts  the  further  investigation  of 
robustness of calculating separate weights in each time period, compared to pooling the data across time, 
as will be discussed in the next section. 
 
The validity of the PCA asset index approach should be assessed to see whether it might reflect realistic 
money-metric baskets of goods in the absence of the latter. Table 1 shows the PCA weights of the most 
robust asset index (as highlighted in the section below), which excludes sporadically measured items 
(such as weapons and seasonal crops). It is evident that adult male slaves were the most highly valued 
items in the basket, with female and child slaves carrying lower weights. This is reflective of the high 
value attached to physically intensive labour. A horse was priced at about 95% of a male slave, while one 
head of cattle or sheep carried similar value to a female slave. Pigs were of low value in asset baskets, 
with one pig carrying only 62% the value of a male slave. This is evident in the low prevalence of this 
item in the sample. Vines were relatively highly valued, with one vine carrying about the same weight as 
a girl slave. It is evident that “inputs” into the production process (slaves as workers and horses as 
transportation) were highly valued in the asset baskets. “Consumption” items (sheep, cattle and vines, 
each of which represented “output”) were valued slightly less, and may be indicative of the more short-
term characterisation of these assets. In sum, it appears that the PCA distinguishes between the value of 
goods in a satisfactory manner in the absence of money-metric measures. 
 




Relative to Male 
Slave 
Male Slaves  0.3985  100.00% 
Female Slaves  0.3609  90.56% 
Boy Slaves  0.3191  80.08% 
Girl Slaves  0.3108  77.99% 
Horses  0.3773  94.68% 
Cattle  0.3341  83.84% 
Sheep  0.3292  82.61% 
Pigs  0.2485  62.36% 
Number of 







                                                                                                                                                             
with one component. The most convincing analyses are for the indices that exclude weapons, suggesting that one 
PCA component effectively captures most of the variation in the data for the more stable indicators in the sample.  
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Robustness Checks of Inequality Trends based on Various Samples and Estimation Strategies 
 
Table 1 summarizes all robustness checks conducted in this study. The various indicators are compared 
across  the  relevant  subsamples  and  estimation  strategies,  as  outlined  above.  Selected  graphical 
illustrations illuminate the discussion in the relevant sections below.
12 
 
Comparing inequality trends with indices constructed for each year and a pooled sample 
 
It is evident that establishing different PCA weights for each year delivers estimates of inequality that are 
broadly consistent with estimates based on PCA weights derived from the sample pooled across all years, 
particularly for the “Core” indices. However, when weapons are included in the index, sporadic trends in 
inequality  are  registered towards the  final  years of  the  sample  (particularly  for  the  sub-samples  that 
exclude slaves). Furthermore, when weapons are included, the Theil coefficient delivers lower inequality 
estimates with pooled PCA weights, particularly from the period 1682-1709 and when both slaves and 
non-farmers are included in the analysis. Figure 2 (a,b and c) illustrates these general observations with 
the  “Common”  index,  which  includes  weapons.  Figure  2d,  using  the  “Core  1”  index,  illustrates  the 
remarkable robustness generally observed when weapons are excluded from the construction of the PCA 
indices. This observation is true, irrespective of sample restrictions. This shows that the “valuation” of 
non-weapon assets has remained consistent over the sample period. 
 
<INSERT Figure 2 HERE> 
 
Conversely, the distribution of weapons was perhaps non-representative in the last years of the sample 
and could well be indicative of inconsistent reporting patterns rather than real movements in society. For 
this reason, the indices including weapons should either not be considered, or only be analysed when 
using pooled weights. Because most other assets appear to have a consistent influence on indices and 
inequality over the entire period, all further analysis continues with pooled weights rather than annually 
estimated indices. This also concurs with the recommendations of McKenzie (2005) and Moser & Felton 
(2007). Though we do not have price data available for these specific assets, the evidence shown by 
Botha (1923) indicates that prices were remarkably stable during the eighteenth century, primarily as a 
result of the mercantilist policies of the VOC. Using pooled weights is, therefore, a valid consideration. 
 
Comparing inequality trends with indices constructed including and excluding non-farmers 
 
Recall that in this study being a non-farmer is implied by the fact that no agricultural assets were held by 
the household under consideration. Note that by this definition slaves are automatically considered to be 
non-farmers, so that these robustness comparisons are redundant when this subpopulation is included. The 
discussion therefore proceeds for the free settler population only. 
 
A priori expectations are confirmed, in that inequality is higher (by the Gini measure) when estimates 
include non-farmers, as a result of the many zeros on agricultural assets. Indeed, it appears that the 
exclusion of non-farmers introduces only a level difference in inequality estimates across time, (without 
any substantial distortion of the trends analysed) for the indeces that excluded weapons. This is evident 
for the “Core 1” index in Figure 3a. This result allows us to conclude that excluding the non-farmer 
population does not distort any trend analysis, which is the primary focus of this study. The inclusion of 
weapons introduces slight differences in the initial and final periods of the sample (see Figure 3b, using 
the “Long Term” index), again pointing to inconsistent measurement of these assets. It is encouraging that 
                                                 
12 Not all figures are presented in the analysis, but only typical observations are shown for illustrative purposes. All 
figures are available from the authors on request. Specific observations with respect to omitted graphs can be found 
in Table 1.  
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the “Common” index (which excluded agricultural assets) displays fairly similar inequality trends for 
both groups. This suggests that there is no substantial between-group inequality between these samples, 
so that an analysis of the farmer population (and agricultural indicators) can be extrapolated to the entire 
population with some confidence (see Figure 3c). 
 
Theil  coefficients  are  not  very  sensitive  to  the  exclusion  of  non-farmers  from  the  indices.  This  is 
particularly true when agricultural indicators are included in the indices (see Figure 3a and Figure 3b). 
The reason for this is that non-farmers appear at the bottom of the asset distribution when agricultural 
indicators are factored into the wealth index; it is furthermore known that the Theil coefficient is more 
sensitive to changes in the upper tail of a distribution than the lower tail (Champernowne, 1974). When 
agricultural indices are not accounted for in the asset index (see Figure 3c), trends are again very similar, 
however weapons introduce some differences (with higher inequality when non-farmers are excluded) in 
a period around 1700. This again suggests that inter-group inequality is not a serious concern, and that 
trends are not compromised, except if weapons are introduced.  
 
It  is  notable  that  the  reported  number  of  flintlocks and  swords decline  substantially  for the  farming 
subsample compared to moderate changes in the non-farming subsample (see Table 3), which underlines 
the notion that these are inferior goods over the period. The prevalence of pistols increases over time in 
the farming segment, while it remains fairly stable at low levels for the non-farming segment. 
 
<INSERT Table 3 HERE> 
 
To remove the effect that weapons might have on these conclusions, a slave index is constructed (by 
assigning PCA weights to the different slave classes). It is evident in  Figure 3d that again only a level 
difference arises with the exclusion of non-farmers for the Gini coefficient, and close movements apply to 
the Theil coefficient. The similar trends across groups, particularly for this slave index, suggest that 
changes in inequality over this period are driven by intertemporal differences of inequality within the 
rural Cape farming and non-farming populations. Inequality between farmers and non-farmers remains 
consistent over the period (despite small differences for the “common” index, though this is driven by 
weapons). Hence, an analysis of within-group inequality of farmers should uncover the dominant trends 
in the rural Cape European settler population. 
 
<INSERT Figure 3 HERE> 
 
Two groups remain in the area west of the first mountains: farmers and non-farmers. Due to the limited 
truly representative information on the non-farmer segment of the population and because the inequality 
trends are not compromised, this category is henceforth excluded from the analysis. As a result, our 
population of analysis is now delineated to the mostly wheat and wine, rural Cape farming community of 
the Cape Colony. However, similar time trends can tentatively be extrapolated to the European population 
at large, as witnessed by the similar directions of changes in inequality when they are included. It must be 
emphasised,  however,  that  levels  of  inequality  cannot  be  inferred  from  the  limited  sample  to  the 
population as a whole. 
 
Comparing inequality trends with indices constructed including and excluding slaves 
 
Because the Cape Colony did not only comprise European settlers, it is necessary to extend the above 
analysis to include slaves. As noted before, a lack of records hinders the analysis of the indigenous Khoi 
population. Slaves were included as individuals that had no assets. Each slave that is owned by a farmer 
was taken to constitute a separate household without any possessions. This assumption concurs with the 
understanding of slavery, but is made primarily because only the number of slaves in the colony can be 
inferred from the data, and not what they possessed. It is evident from Figure 4 that the inclusion of  
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zeroes for slaves only alters the level of Gini-based inequality (with a similar trend), while conclusions 
for Theil-based inequality remain unchanged. The former observation is true because the Gini coefficient 
is less sensitive to what happens at the bottom of the tail; the latter holds because the Theil coefficient is 
completely insensitive to zeroes. This illustration is consistent, regardless of the index used. The inclusion 
of slaves as assetless individuals therefore adds no information on inequality trends, and is a fruitless 
accounting exercise. 
 
<INSERT Figure 4HERE> 
 
Summary of robustness checks 
It is evident throughout that the inclusion of weapons provides inconsistent results. This is particularly 
true in the comparison of annual and pooled PCA weights. The stability of the latter compared to the 
former suggests that pooled weights account best for inconsistent measurement. The exclusion of non-
farmers only registers differences associated with differences in weapon reporting. Otherwise, inequality 
trends are uncompromised, suggesting further analysis with only the farming population. Furthermore, the 
inclusion  of  assetless  slaves  as  at  the  bottom  of  the  asset  distribution  adds  nothing  to  the  analysis. 
Therefore the analysis continues with both Gini and Theil coefficients, based on indices derived from a 
pooled dataset and including only the farming settler population. Results can tentatively be extrapolated 
to the population at large, as there is little evidence in the available data to suggest any systematically 
different patterns for other segments of society. 
 
Trends in inequality for the settler population 
 
Using pooled PCA weights and considering only the farming population,  Figure 5 exhibits trends in 
inequality with regards to all relevant asset indices and using both the Gini and Theil Coefficients.  
 
<INSERT Figure 5 HERE> 
 
Three general observations follow. Firstly, it is important to note that conclusions about trends based on 
Gini and Theil coefficients differ negligibly (a comparison of Figure 5 a and b reveals this). Secondly, a 
noticeable level difference in inequality arises, once weapons are omitted from the indices. Trends are, 
however, similar, if not slightly dampened by the inclusion of weapons. Thirdly, indices that include 
weapons and volatile short term assets (such as grain seed), deliver more “spiky” inequality trends than 
those that do not ( “Core 1”, “Core 2” and “Core 3”).  
A first glance at the final results reveals a number of first insights. In the initial stages of settlement, 
inequality  is  at  its  lowest  level  compared  to  the  subsequent  period  of  analysis  for  most  indices 
investigated.
13 A stable path then emerged until 1682, when inequality accelerated rapidly until a turning 
point roughly around 1700. Thereafter inequality declined steadily until 1738. The indices that include the 
more volatile assets deliver a stable (perhaps slightly increasing) trend in inequality for the rest of the 
period. The more robust indices indicat e that inequality again rises towards the end of the period of 
analysis. Given the discussion presented above, the latter indices are preferred for final analysis.   The 
differences in inequality trends based on the three “Core” indices in no way have different interpretation. 
This suggests that sticking to one of these indices to measure inequality does not alter our understanding 
of the path of inequality in the first century of Dutch settlement. 
 
                                                 
13 The initial drop and correction in inequality displayed by the “Short and Long Term” and “Core 3” indices should 
be viewed with caution, particularly given the small sample sizes during this period.  
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It is evident that inequality has not persisted at initial levels throughout the century of analysis, and that 
there is a definite trend worth analysing in more depth.
14 Figure 5c displays only the “Core 1” index with 
its 95% confidence interval. This is used to identify whether inequality changed significantly over the 
period.
15  The four broad periods postulated above are clearly discernable, with significant change s 
identified by the confidence intervals. The confidence interval is fairly broad during the early years (as a 
result of small sample sizes). What does, however, emerge is that inequality remained stable at fairly 
moderate levels (with a Gini of about 0.5) from the beginning of the period of analysis until 1682. This 
was followed by a period of significant increase to fairly high levels (with the Gini reaching a maximum 
of 0.65 in 1709, which is beyond the bounds of the initial period). Thereafter a period of decline is 
witnessed, with the Gini dropping to 0.56 by 1738 (this being a significant change), followed by  yet 
another spurt of increases in inequality to 0.62 by 1757 (which is again significantly higher than in 1738). 
While  there  is  substantial  “churning”  in  inequality  levels,  it  is  evident  that  they  never  recovered  to 
sustained  “low”  levels  of  inequality.  This  suggests  that  while  there  may  be  many  changes  between 
moderate to high levels, inequality nevertheless persistently remains above a moderate threshold in this 
context, which provides an indication that at least some portions of society were able to extend the status 
quo. 
 
The relatively low inequality (with a Gini coefficient of 0.501 based on the “Core 1” measure) initially 
registered is indicative of a society that is newly established. All households that settled at the Cape 
arrived with few possessions, suggesting that few differences in the wealth distribution existed. It should 
also be noted that farming operations were still fairly homogenous during this period, with viticulture not 
yet established at the Cape, so that there was not much specialisation in the economy that distinguished 
one family from another. Two processes then emerged and drove inequality, as this society remained in 
flux. Firstly existing farmers were able to establish their production into viable operations, so that the 
wealth of first generation immigrants increased. Secondly, fresh arrivals of immigrants arrived at the 
Cape with few possessions to farm on unsettled land. Both of these features drove inequality upwards, but 
the dynamics occur at opposite extremes of the distribution.
16  
 
As  the  population  expanded  exogenously,  new  frontier land  was  cultivated  and new towns  were 
established, which still had to attain the wealth that first generation immigrants had obtained. This 
suggests that a new society in flux could experience  rising inequality during the initial periods of 
expansion, purely as a result of migration patterns. From the early 1700s, when immigration was 
discouraged by the VOC, exogenous factors played a lesser role in population dynamics. Population 
growth shifted to a predominantly endogenous trajectory, which means that the bottom tail of the wealth 
distribution was not constantly “replenished” by poor immigrants. However, as time progressed, later 
immigrants were able to converge to the first generation of immigrants, so that inequality declined with 
the stabilisation of the economic structures. Migration and subsequent acclimatisation may therefore have 
an important role to play in the evolution of inequality. 
 
These dynamics are more clearly visible in Figure 6, where the distributions are depicted. For the “Core 
1” index a fleshed out bottom tail emerges in 1678 (the year that Stellenbosch was established) and in 
1692 (the first year that the Drakenstein district‟s French Hugenots appear in the opgaafrollen following 
                                                 
14 A Phillips-Peron stationarity test on this time series of Gini coefficients based on “Core 1” delivers a McKinnon 
approximate p-value of 0.1485, hence not rejecting the hypothesis of a unit root. This suggests that this series does 
change over the entire period. 
15 Should the Gini coefficient move within the confidence band of the previous period, inequality is not considered 
to have changed significantly. Should, however, the Gini coefficient move above (below) the confidence interval of 
the previous period, then inequality has risen (dropped) by a significant margin. 
16 It is for this reason that the Theil coefficient was implemented alongside the Gini coefficient, as the latter is less 
sensitive to differences in the tails of a distribution compared to at the mode.  
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their arrival in 1688). This weight remains in 1700. Following this, immigration declined and by 1731 the 
bottom tail diminished substantially, while the weight started to progressively shift towards the upper tail 
of the distribution, suggesting that there is a convergence process at play once the population grows 
endogenously. 
 
Immigration restrictions may well be comparable to the attempts by established elites in South America to 
maintain their advantageous positions (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002: 18). However, reasons for these 
moves in the Cape Colony were rather related to concerns that new arrivals could often not subsist on the 
frontier, and because the existing farmers provided enough crops to sustain the refreshment station. While 
these restrictions maintained high inequality in South America, it allowed inequality to stabilise at the 
Cape, with the convergence of the poorest to the mean becoming a reality. This, however, occurred at the 
same time that the elite was able to strengthen its position for reasons mentioned below. 
 
<INSERT Figure 6 HERE> 
 
With the discouragement of immigration, the second process that drove inequality ceased, while the first 
continued and started to dominate, with the emergence of a gentry class. From 1738 a new trend emerges. 
Again,  Figure  6  illuminates  this  development  most  succinctly.  The  rise  in  inequality  is  driven 
predominantly by an emerging upper tail. By 1757 a small group of households attain asset index values 
that are well in excess of previous years. This progressive fleshing out of the upper tail can be explained 
by a number of factors. First, the first generation of immigrants is, by this stage, established in viable 
farming operations with many farmers already having transferred their assets to sons. Secondly, farming 
activity  became  progressively  more  diversified,  with  those  practising  viticulture  able  to  distinguish 
themselves from the traditional farmers. Thirdly, VOC monopoly and monopsony contracts were granted 
to selected individuals, for whom it became important to maintain this new balance of power that drove 
inequality. Together, these factors explain the emergence of a gentry, as indicated in the literature (Guelke 
and Shell 1983), and were the target of the sumptuary laws implemented in 1755. 
 
Furthermore, the growth of the “non-farmer” proportion of the sample (see Table 3 ) suggests that we 
may be dealing with a structural change in the economy at this point in time. A non-agricultural sector 
was required to service the needs of a maturing economy. This sector may have fuelled the rise of a non-
agricultural gentry class. In fact, while contentious, this period may be classified as the beginning of 
proto-industrialisation at the Cape. If true, the results support the super-Kuznets hypothesis (van Zanden, 
1995) that inequality rises during the period of proto-industrialisation. Data that more closely represents 
this segment of the population is required to uncover these issues more fully: inequality between farmers 
and non-farmers could start to assume an important role in its contribution to overall inequality towards 
the  end  of the  period,  particularly  with  the  expansion  of  the  frontier  during  this  time.  This  data  is, 
however, not yet available to the knowledge of the authors. 
 
8. INTERPRETATIONS AND COMPARISONS 
 
The Cape Colony was characterised by initially moderate inequality, followed by a series of changes 
which brought inequality to high levels by the end of the first century of European colonisation. Three 
important trends are observed which also fit the historical evidence. Inequality rises significantly during a 
period of immigration into the Cape (the arrival of French Huguenots in 1688 is of particular interest 
here).  The initially poor population of consecutive fresh arrivals converged to the mean, but was replaced 
by new impoverished settlers arriving from abroad, as immigration continued. After immigration was 
discouraged in the early 18
th century, this cycle of convergence came to completion, so that inequality 
declined somewhat. By the 1730s, a small elite emerged, forcing the Company to impose sumptuary laws 




What explains these results? The quantitative and historical evidence support Engerman and Sokoloff‟s 
hypothesis: the conditions at the Cape created the right environment for the formation of a slave based 
economy where a small elite attained economic and political power. Immigration (the decline during the 
early eighteenth century), land (the system in the interior) and labour (the decision to remain a slave 
economy) were curtailed to maintain this power balance. Yet, these conditions did not exist when the first 
settlers arrived. In contrast to other newly settled regions, the climate and environment could initially not 
support large plantations (as Van Riebeeck realised early after settlement) and had few and sporadically 
located natives. Yet, the mercantilist policies of the Dutch East India Company created fertile conditions 
for the rise of institutions where one group could attain dominance. This may have been because the 
Company  perceived  such  an  outcome  to  be  most  profitable.  While  the  literature  presupposes  that 
institutions that foster inequality developed given certain „initial conditions‟, the case of the Cape Colony 
suggests that these „initial conditions‟ could also be created, or at least, enhanced, by the government (in 
this  case,  the  Dutch  East  India  Company).  While  it  can  only  be  speculation,  it  is  likely  that  the 
distribution of wealth at the Cape would have shifted considerably had the farmers in the interior received 
full property rights, manufacturing had been allowed, had trade been free, or if slavery had been abolished 
a century earlier. 
 
While  one  can  deduce  from  the  results  that  inequality  became  more  severe  during  the  period  under 
analysis, the Gini and Theil indices used here are not fully comparable (in levels
17) with those of other 
settler societies and post-Colonial South Africa, as the source data (the opgaafrollen) and the variables it 
includes are unique to the period and location. However, given this limitation, it does help to relate the 
experience of the Cape Colony to those of other newly settled regions, in particular, and other  pre-
industrial countries during this period in general, to provide some perspective on the relative levels of 
inequality  found  at  the  Cape.  Milanovic,  Lindert  and  Williamson  (2008)  provide  comparative  Gini-
coefficients of select societies in history. For example, they calculate a Gini for England and Wales in 
1688 of 0.45 and for Holland in 1732 of 0.61. Evidence for newly settled regions is varied, with New 
Spain in 1780 reaching relatively high inequality of 0.64, compared to the low Gini of 0.33for Bihar, 
India in 1807. It is presumed that these measures include the native population. When the slaves are 
included as zero-asset owners in the Cape sample, inequality increases to coefficients above 0.70 over the 
period. The tentative quantitative comparisons suggest that the inequality at the Cape was at least as high 
as those found in other newly settled societies such as Spanish America. This, together with the trend 
analysis which concurs with an adaptation of the Engermann & Sokoloff hypothesis, suggests that other 
newly settled regions (for which long series of inequality measures are not readily available, as in the 
current context) may also have indeed experienced similar patterns of moderate to high inequality. The 
fact that the Cape Colony never recovered from these relatively high levels of inequality infers that indeed 
the institutions that fostered the creation of an elite were able to maintain the status quo. However, this 
paper has identified specific pre-conditions that are not necessarily relevant to other settler societies, 
namely the institutions created by a profit-motivated company rather than an elite representing a national 
crown. This suggests that similar time series of inequality need to be linked to the specific institutional 
and demographic shifts that were noted in history for those colonial societies. 
 
The  Cape  colony  was  also  a  pre-industrial society and  inequality  trends  may  have  resulted from  an 
emerging super-Kuznets curve, as proposed by Van Zanden. Yet, there is little evidence that the Cape 
experienced  a  period  of  proto-industrialisation  over  the  first  century  of  settlement.  None  of  the 
                                                 
17 It is even evident that the exclusion of weapons raises levels of inequality substantially within the same society. 
However, regardless of the basket of goods, the trends remain consistent. To find comparable baskets of goods in 
other colonies to compare levels of inequality is not feasible, but trend comparisons may be more realistic. It is 
therefore not clear whether inequality levels are “high” relative to other countries and money-metric measures in 
other periods. What is, however important, is that the evolution of inequality over this period can be compared to the 
evolution of inequality in other societies.  
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explanations for an increase in inequality are found at the early Cape: wage labour (in the rural areas) was 
virtually non-existent during the initial period of settlement (invalidating the Williamson hypothesis), 
migration took place  into the interior (which resulted in a larger share of agriculture rather than industry) 
and industry was prohibited (thus refuting Kuznets‟ own and the classical reasons for a rise in inequality). 
Only towards the latter part of the sample period (after the 1740s) may such a structural break have 
occured, although corroborative evidence should be found for this in wage and production trends. An 
extension of the sample period would highlight whether it is valid to compare the Cape Colony with other 
pre-industrial countries (in particular for Holland, as Van Zanden did), and whether a  super-Kuznets 
curve can be inferred. This later data would reveal whether the increasing trend towards the end of the 
period is sustained, and would also allow a study of a period when industry was indeed allowed.  
 
South Africa is an extremely unequal society in the modern period, with a Gini coefficient of 0.60 and 
above characterising the post-Apartheid period. Together with Brazil, it ranks as one of the most unequal 
societies in the world (Bhorat, et al. 2001). It would be dangerous to simply extrapolate the high levels of 
initial inequality found at the Cape Colony to the high and persistent levels of inequality in present South 
Africa. Inequality in South Africa today is a legacy of a host of different factors, including the discovery 
of minerals (diamonds and gold), immigration and migration, wars and depressions, and the more recent 
segregationist and Apartheid policies that were in place during most of the 20
th century. Yet, one feels 
tempted to draw some parallels between the high levels of inequality during the early phases of European 
settlement and inequality in modern-day South Africa, especially if the Engerman-Sokoloff hypothesis 
remains a valid theory to analyse inequality over four centuries. The institutions that evolved from the 
early settlement period protected the status quo, binding the high levels of inequality at the Cape and 
establishing  similar  institutions  as  the  Colony  expanded  to  the  East.  The  indentured  labour  of  the 
Voortrekkers, the segregationist policies under British rule (for example, the Glen Grey Act of 1894) and 
the Apartheid policies after 1948 were to some extent policies influenced by institutions that evolved 
during the period of initial settlement. In various guises, social scientists have supported these claims: one 
factor,  according  to  Terreblanche  (2002:393),  that  “contributed  most,  directly  and  indirectly,  to  the 
inequalities  in  [South  Africa‟s]  income  distribution”  was  the  “racism  and  racial  inequality  in  the 
distribution  of  political,  economic,  and  ideological  power”  during,  in  part,  the  period  of  “Dutch 
colonialism”.  Maybe  Charles  Feinstein,  in  discussing  the  challenges  facing  the  post-Apartheid 
government, summarizes the effect of the persistent levels of inequality most accurately: “South Africa‟s 





The Engerman-Sokoloff hypothesis suggests that high initial inequality in settler regions would create 
institutions where inequality persists. The Van Zanden hypothesis holds that inequality will increase in 
societies during the proto-industrialisation phase. The Cape Colony, given the mercantilist policies and 
the available quantitative evidence, provides a unique case study of the inequality dynamics in a newly 
settled, pre-industrial setting. We find that inequality was relatively high during most of the first century, 
increasing especially after the introduction of viticulture and slaves by the end of the 17
th century.  Unlike 
other newly settled regions (and partially different to the reasons put forward by Engerman and Sokoloff) 
the unequal Cape society developed not because of certain “initial endowments” but due to the policies 
enacted by the Dutch East India Company. These mercantilist policies, including restrictions on trade and 
prices, the importation of slaves as opposed to encouraging European immigration and the prohibition of 
industry,  created  institutions  that  protected  the  status  quo  and  entrenched  inequality.  This  chain  of 
causality is not exactly the same as, but mimics the  predictions made by Engerman and Sokoloff, which 
suggests that institutions specific to the Cape could deliver similar outcomes to other settler colonies, 
where elites developed for different reasons. These institutions, to some extent, would later evolve into  
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the unequal institutions that promoted segregationist and Apartheid policies, shaping modern-day South 
African inequality. 
 
This study is a first quantitative attempt at understanding inequality of this understudied period in South 
African economic history. Many questions remain. The availability of large and detailed data sets should 
encourage further research in this field and, hopefully, enlighten our understanding of the roots of modern 
day inequality in South Africa, and of developing countries in general. In particular, the use of asset 
inequality measures in the absence of other detailed micro data have allowed the verification of various 
theories regarding inequality before the advent of industrialisation, and in this particular case the study of 
the Cape Colony illuminates these observations by taking the dynamics of a newly settled society into 
account.  The  analysis  of  a  country  that  is  a  developing  economy  in  modern  times  shows  that  the 
conventional  wisdom  surrounding  the  roots  of  inequality  is  verified  in  this  setting.  However,  it  is 
important to note the role of the VOC (as a company, rather than a national authority) in purposefully 
assisting the persistence of the institutions that drove inequality for profit purposes, despite the absence of 
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Table 2a  Composition of PCA indices and comparison inequality trends based on different sample restrictions 
    Index   
    Long & Short 































Adult Male Slaves  X  X  X  X  X  X   
Adult Female Slaves  X  X  X  X  X  X   
Boy Slaves  X  X  X  X  X  X   
Girl Slaves  X  X  X  X  X  X   
Horses  X  X  X  X  X     
Cattle  X  X  X  X  X     
Sheep  X  X  X  X  X     
Pigs  X  X  X  X       
Vines  X  X  X    X     
Wheat Sown (in muids)  X             
Rye Sown (in muids)  X             
Barley Sown (in muids)  X             
Flintlocks  X  X        X   
Pistols  X  X        X   
































































Gini including non-farmers 
























































Theil including non-farmers 






































































































































































































Gini excluding non-farmers 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Gini including non-farmers 






















































































































































































































































































Theil including non-farmers 
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 Table 3 Distribution of Total Number of Slaves owned by free settlers - by Sample (Large Figures are means, Standard deviations in Italics, with sample size in cell below. Data is not weighted by household size.) 
 
Total Slaves  Flintlocks  Swords  Pistol 
Year  Farmers  Non-Farmers  Whole Sample  Farmers  Non-Farmers  Whole Sample  Farmers  Non-Farmers  Whole Sample  Farmers  Non-Farmers  Whole Sample 
1663  0.792  0.000  0.373  1.875  0.296  1.039  0.042  0.000  0.020  0.625  0.000  0.294 
   1.693  0.000  1.216  1.513  0.669  1.385  0.204  0.000  0.140  0.770  0.000  0.610 
   24  27  51  24  27  51  24  27  51  24  27  51 
1670  1.257  0.188  0.922  2.829  0.438  2.078  1.029  0.250  0.784  0.714  0.000  0.490 
   2.994  0.750  2.552  2.684  1.031  2.544  0.707  0.775  0.808  1.226  0.000  1.065 
   35  16  51  35  16  51  35  16  51  35  16  51 
1678  2.637  0.055  1.646  2.295  0.484  1.599  1.288  0.440  0.962  0.445  0.022  0.283 
   3.699  0.311  3.166  1.711  0.621  1.651  0.902  0.581  0.894  1.057  0.210  0.864 
   146  91  237  146  91  237  146  91  237  146  91  237 
1682  2.313  0.042  1.804  2.145  0.750  1.832  1.169  0.792  1.084  0.410  0.000  0.318 
   3.457  0.204  3.187  3.562  0.442  3.193  0.695  0.509  0.675  1.169  0.000  1.042 
   83  24  107  83  24  107  83  24  107  83  24  107 
1685  2.494  0.014  1.365  2.482  0.423  1.545  1.412  0.394  0.949  0.353  0.000  0.192 
   3.816  0.119  3.071  1.836  0.625  1.750  0.849  0.597  0.900  0.984  0.000  0.746 
   85  71  156  85  71  156  85  71  156  85  71  156 
1688  1.758  0.096  1.145  1.528  0.596  1.184  0.441  0.032  0.290  0.578  0.383  0.506 
   3.786  0.442  3.122  1.757  0.515  1.498  0.850  0.177  0.711  0.946  0.489  0.813 
   161  94  255  161  94  255  161  94  255  161  94  255 
1692  1.365  0.176  0.829  1.784  0.758  1.322  0.932  0.681  0.819  0.468  0.027  0.270 
   4.281  0.809  3.270  1.677  0.670  1.416  1.101  0.602  0.918  0.765  0.195  0.621 
   222  182  404  222  182  404  222  182  404  222  182  404 
1695  1.996  0.056  1.217  1.735  0.883  1.393  1.269  0.894  1.118  0.534  0.039  0.335 
   4.833  0.312  3.860  1.884  0.339  1.530  0.785  0.342  0.670  0.809  0.194  0.682 
   268  180  448  268  180  448  268  180  448  268  180  448 
1700  2.989  0.315  1.966  1.328  0.976  1.194  1.277  0.970  1.159  0.542  0.048  0.353 
   5.690  1.263  4.718  1.226  0.218  0.987  0.939  0.203  0.763  0.697  0.240  0.616 
   271  168  439  271  168  439  271  168  439  271  168  439 
1702  2.467  0.190  1.457  1.717  0.899  1.354  1.137  0.877  1.022  0.539  0.049  0.321 
   4.942  0.712  3.883  2.326  0.388  1.799  0.699  0.340  0.583  0.645  0.215  0.558 
   336  268  604  336  268  604  336  268  604  336  268  604 
1709  4.185  0.436  2.472  1.777  0.975  1.410  1.252  0.962  1.119  0.657  0.054  0.381 
   7.290  1.320  5.754  2.271  0.177  1.724  0.939  0.192  0.719  0.707  0.227  0.620 
   373  314  687  373  314  687  373  314  687  373  314  687 
1712  4.360  0.435  2.716  1.679  0.914  1.359  1.165  0.914  1.060  0.551  0.051  0.341 
   7.859  1.172  6.339  2.016  0.292  1.593  0.817  0.280  0.660  0.679  0.221  0.591 
   405  292  697  405  292  697  405  292  697  405  292  697 
                         
                          
30 
 
1716  8.164  1.005  4.070  1.356  0.703  0.982  1.137  0.697  0.886  0.582  0.062  0.284 
   9.026  1.973  7.039  1.717  0.531  1.234  1.112  0.503  0.848  0.651  0.241  0.530 
   146  195  341  146  195  341  146  195  341  146  195  341 
1719  5.647  0.591  3.253  1.490  0.823  1.174  1.157  0.820  0.997  0.625  0.109  0.381 
   8.121  1.601  6.502  1.618  0.429  1.255  1.051  0.431  0.835  0.653  0.321  0.583 
   408  367  775  408  367  775  408  367  775  408  367  775 
1723  2.645  0.836  2.120  0.892  0.748  0.850  0.876  0.744  0.838  0.700  0.098  0.525 
   3.677  1.985  3.378  0.550  0.439  0.525  0.534  0.451  0.514  0.514  0.298  0.536 
   1193  488  1681  1193  488  1681  1193  488  1681  1193  488  1681 
1731  6.268  1.545  4.494  0.975  0.619  0.841  0.949  0.622  0.826  0.642  0.041  0.416 
   9.138  2.988  7.791  0.772  0.498  0.704  0.664  0.498  0.627  0.646  0.239  0.606 
   567  341  908  567  341  908  567  341  908  567  341  908 
1738  6.892  1.702  4.902  0.883  0.582  0.768  0.877  0.582  0.764  0.561  0.047  0.364 
   9.337  3.602  8.066  0.505  0.494  0.522  0.415  0.494  0.469  0.520  0.212  0.496 
   685  426  1111  685  426  1111  685  426  1111  685  426  1111 
1741  5.924  1.281  4.107  0.912  0.633  0.803  0.912  0.633  0.803  0.672  0.061  0.433 
   9.539  2.835  7.977  0.284  0.482  0.398  0.284  0.482  0.398  0.470  0.240  0.496 
   759  488  1247  759  488  1247  759  488  1247  759  488  1247 
1752  3.409  0.836  2.857  0.835  0.836  0.835  0.828  0.836  0.830  0.794  0.096  0.644 
   6.389  2.120  5.843  0.371  0.371  0.371  0.378  0.371  0.376  0.404  0.295  0.479 
   802  219  1021  802  219  1021  802  219  1021  802  219  1021 
1757  4.371  1.233  3.233  0.880  0.645  0.795  0.880  0.645  0.795  0.753  0.039  0.494 
   7.221  2.709  6.177  0.325  0.479  0.404  0.325  0.479  0.404  0.431  0.193  0.500 
   1139  648  1787  1139  648  1787  1139  648  1787  1139  648  1787 
Total  4.203  0.839  2.936  1.190  0.737  1.019  0.975  0.718  0.878  0.645  0.064  0.426 
   7.237  2.245  6.099  1.317  0.474  1.101  0.674  0.470  0.618  0.616  0.250  0.582 
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Figure 3 Comparison of inequality trends  using indeces including and excluding non-farmers: “Common” index to evaluate between group inequality;  “Core3” as an example of the exclusion of weapons; “Core 1” as an 
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Figure 5c Gini coefficient based on “Core 1” with 95% confidence interval  
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